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"No-CONSULTATION" ORDERS IN DEPOSITIONS
Counsel and their witness-clients shall not engage in private, off-the-record
conferences during depositions or during breaks or recesses, except for the
purpose of deciding whether to assert a privilege.
Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in violation of, [the above]
guideline are a proper subject for inquiry by deposing counsel to ascertain
whether there has been any witness-coaching and, if so, what.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The late Judge Robert S. Gawthrop, III, of the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia, started a maelstrom of debate among trial attorneys, legal ethicists, and the
judiciary2 when he entered this "no-consultation ' 3 order in 1993. He drafted the
order to stop attorneys from coaching witnesses during depositions. The
attorneys sought his judicial help when the deposition process broke down over
the issue of witness coaching. When entering his order, Judge Gawthrop
explained the problem he was trying to rectify:
The underlying purpose of a deposition is to find out what a witness saw, heard,
or did-what the witness thinks .... The witness comes to the deposition to
testify, not to indulge in a parody of Charlie McCarthy, with lawyers coaching
or bending the witness's words to mold a legally convenient record. It is the
witness-not the lawyer-who is the witness.4
To curb witness coaching, Judge Gawthrop prohibited all discussions between
attorneys and their clients once the deposition started. The only exception was a
conference between the attorneys and their clients to determine if the attorneys
should protect the client by asserting a claim of privilege over a particular topic or
line of questioning. To put teeth into his order, Judge Gawthrop specified that if
an attorney violated the order and talked with the client after the deposition
began, the conversation lost the cloak of protection of the attorney-client
privilege. The deposing attorney could inquire into the content of the off-the-
record attorney-deponent discussion.
Judge Gawthrop did not turn his order in Hall into a standing order for future
cases in his courtroom. It remained an order applicable only to the litigation in
Hall, and therefore might have remained an interesting anomaly 5 if other federal
1. Hall v. Clifton Precision Inc., 150 F.R.D. 525, 531-532 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
2. See Dennis R. Suplee & Diana S. Donaldson, Dealing with the Difficult Opponent: Judicial Approaches to
Deposition Dynamics, PA. L. WKLY., May 19, 2003, at 8; David H. Taylor, Rambo as Potted Plant: Local
Rulemaking's Preemptive Strike Against Witness-Coaching During Depositions, 40 VILL. L. REv. 1057 (1995);
L.A. County Bar Ass'n Prof'l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 497 (1999) (consulting with a client
during a deposition), reprinted in 22 L.A. LAW. 68 (1999).
3. See Sandra F. Gavin, Playing by the Rules: Strategies for Defending Depositions, 1999 L. REv. MICH. ST.
U. DETRoIT C. L. 645,646-647 (1999) (coining the term "no-consultation").
4. Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 528.
5. Suplee & Donaldson, supra note 2.
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judges had not followed his lead with similar prohibitions regarding attorney-
client conferences during depositions.6 Several states have also followed Judge
Gawthrop's lead by adopting language in their respective rules of civil procedure
that prohibit, to varying degrees, conferences between lawyers and their clients
once a deposition has begun. 7
There is no question that coaching of witnesses during a deposition can
significantly interfere with the deposing attorney's access to truthful testimony
6. See O'Brien v. Amtrak, 163 F.R.D. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint, No.
94-CV-4603, 1995 WL 79237 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1995); Langer v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., Civ. A. Nos. 87-4000,
91-1814 and 88-1064, 1995 WL 79520 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 1995); Armstrong v. Hussman Corp., 163 F.R.D. 299,
302-04 (E.D. Mo. 1995); Johnson v. Wayne Manor Apartments, 152 F.R.D. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1993); United States v.
Davila, No. 96C00031, 1996 WL 762114 (O.C.A.H.O. Oct. 11, 1996); see also COLO. U.S. DIST. CT. Crv. R.
30.3(A) ("The following abusive deposition conduct is prohibited: 1. Making objections or statements which
have the effect of coaching the witness, instructing the witness concerning the way in which he or she should
frame a response, or suggesting an answer to the witness. 2. Interrupting examination for an off-the-record
conference between counsel and the witness, except for the purpose of determining whether to assert a privilege.
Any off-the-record conference during a recess may be a subject for inquiry by opposing counsel, or pro se party,
to the extent the conference is not privileged.").
7. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1) ("Continual and unwarranted off the record conferences between the deponent
and counsel following the propounding of questions and prior to the answer or at any time during the deposition
are prohibited."); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 30(d)(1) ("From the commencement until the conclusion of a
deposition, including any recesses or continuances thereof of less than five calendar days, the attorney(s) for the
deponent shall not: (A) consult or confer with the deponent regarding the substance of the testimony already
given or anticipated to be given except for the purpose of conferring on whether to assert a privilege against
testifying or on how to comply with a court order, or (B) suggest to the deponent the manner in which any
question should be answered."); N.J. CT. R. 4:14-3(f) ("Once the deponent has been sworn, there shall be no
communication between the deponent and counsel during the course of the deposition while testimony is being
taken except with regard to the assertion of a claim of privilege, a right to confidentiality or a limitation pursuant
to a previously entered court order."); S.C. R. Civ. P. 300)(5)-(6) ("(5) Counsel and a witness shall not engage in
private, off-the-record conferences during depositions or during breaks or recesses regarding the substance of
the testimony at the deposition, except for the purpose of deciding whether to assert a privilege or to make an
objection or to move for a protective order. (6) Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in violation of,
section (5) of this rule are proper subjects for inquiry by deposing counsel to ascertain whether there has been
any witness coaching and, if so, to what extent and nature."); TENN. R. Civ. P. 30.03 advisory commission cmt.
to 1995 amendment ("Some courts have reminded the bar that a deposition is a formal judicial proceeding -
albeit absent a presiding judge - and consequently consultations between counsel and deponent during
questioning are not to be tolerated any more than it would be in the courtroom."); see also Hall, 150 F.R.D. at
525 (prohibiting all attorney-client discussions once the deposition had started except to determine whether
client should assert a claim of privilege). Two states prohibit conferences during the deposition, but permit
conferences during recesses and breaks. See TEx. R. Crv. P. 199.5(d) ("The oral deposition must be conducted in
the same manner as if the testimony were being obtained in court during trial. Counsel should cooperate with
and be courteous to each other and to the witness. The witness should not be evasive and should not unduly
delay the examination. Private conferences between the witness and the witness's attorney during the actual
taking of the deposition are improper except for the purpose of determining where a privilege should be
asserted. Private conferences may be held, however during recesses and adjournments. If the lawyers and
witnesses do not comply with the rule, the court may allow in evidence at trial statements, objections,
discussions, and other occurrences during the oral deposition that reflect upon the credibility of the witness or
the testimony."); WASH. SUP. CT. Civ. R. 30(h)(5) ("Except where agreed to, attorneys shall not privately confer
with deponents during the deposition between a question and an answer except for the purpose of determining
the existence of privilege. Conferences with attorneys during normal recesses and at adjournment are
permissible unless prohibited by the court.").
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from the witness. 8 Many deposing lawyers have been frustrated by constant
interruptions of the deposition caused by the defending attorney's objections that
thinly disguise coaching instructions to the witness. 9 In one now famous
exchange in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,' ° Mr.
Johnston, Delaware counsel for the defendant, QVC, arranged to take a
deposition of a witness, J. Hugh Liedtke, in Texas. Joseph D. Jamail appeared on
behalf of Mr. Liedtke at the deposition. The following exchange demonstrates
both the coaching of the witness and the Rambo tactics employed by the
defending attorney, Mr. Jamail:
A. [Mr.Liedtke:] I vaguely recall [Mr. Oresman's letter] .... I think I did read
it, probably.
Q. (By Mr. Johnston [Delaware counsel for QVC]) Okay. Do you have any idea
why Mr. Oresman was calling that material to your attention?
MR. JAMAIL: Don't answer that. How would he know what was going on in
Mr. Oresman's mind? Don't answer it. Go on to your next question.
MR. JOHNSTON: No, Joe-
MR. JAMAIL: He's not going to answer that. Certify it. I'm going to shut it
down if you don't go to your next question.
MR. JOHNSTON: No, Joe, Joe-
MR. JAMAIL: Don't Joe me, asshole. You can ask some questions, but get off
of that. I'm tired of you. You could gag a maggot off a meat wagon. Now, we've
helped you every way we can.
MR. JOHNSTON: Let's just take it easy.
MR. JAMAIL: No, we're not going to take it easy. Get done with this. 1
The Delaware Supreme Court was so outraged by Mr. Jamail's behavior that it
8. See, e.g., Choflin v. Gordon, 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 357 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995). The court prohibited the
defending attorney from taking future depositions and attending other depositions in the case unless
accompanied by another member of the bar who would be permitted to make appropriate objections. Id. at * 11.
When explaining its unusual ruling, the court admonished: "A deposition is meant to be a question-and-answer
conversation between the deposing lawyer and the witness. There is no proper need for the witness's own
lawyer to act as an intermediary, interpreting questions, deciding which questions the witness should answer,
and helping the witness to formulate answers." Id. at *10.
9. See In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D. Nev. 1998) ("What this Court, and the
Federal Rules of Procedure seek to prevent is coaching the witness by telling the witness what to say or how to
answer a specific question.").
10. 637A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
11. Id. at 53-54 (addendum to the opinion relating to the issue of professionalism in depositions).
2006]
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raised the issue of professionalism sua sponte in an addendum to a lengthy
opinion on the merits of the case. The court characterized the behavior of Mr.
Jamail as "extraordinarily rude, uncivil, and vulgar" and gave him thirty days to
make a voluntary appearance to show cause why his conduct "should not be
considered as a bar to any future appearance.., in a Delaware proceeding."' 2 Mr.
Jamail did not respond. 3
Although this article does not address the potential violations of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") raised by the issue of witness
coaching, it appears that two rules may apply to the situation. Model Rule 3.2
provides that a "lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation
consistent with the interests of the client."'14 Frequent baseless objections and
speaking objections by the attorney defending the deponent will of course
needlessly prolong the deposition, thereby slowing the litigation. In addition,
Model Rule 3.4 provides that a "lawyer shall not: (a) unlawfully obstruct another
party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or
other material having potential evidentiary value." 5 Certainly, some attorneys
who engage in witness coaching are attempting to obstruct the opponent's access
to evidence.
In 1996, I wrote an article documenting the Rambo tactics employed by some
lawyers when defending their clients in a deposition. In that article, I advocated
that judges and the organized bar take an assertive role in controlling this ethical
cancer growing in the deposition room. 16 I outlined several methods for
defending attorneys to use to prevent Rambo lawyers from controlling the
deposition room. One of the methods for controlling the coaching of witnesses
that I discussed was for the deposing attorney to seek a blanket order from the
trial judge "prohibiting all consultations between clients and their defending
attorneys once a deposition has begun."1 7 1 cited Judge Gawthrop's order in Hall
v. Clifton Precision as a model for such an order.' 8 I warned that such blanket
"no-consultation" orders "may also stop any necessary consultation between the
attorney and his or her client concerning whether a mistake has been made or
fraudulent testimony has been given."' 9 However, at that time I did not anticipate
the full consequences of these "no-consultation" orders.
When judges enter these "no-consultation" orders, they successfully muzzle
12. Id. at 53, 56.
13. Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions, Controlling an Ethical Cancer in Civil Litigation, 25 HOFSThA L.
REv. 561, 567 n.13 (1996).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.2 (2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
15. MODEL RULES R. 3.4.
16. Cary, supra note 13, at 561.
17. Id. at 587 (citing Johnson v. Wayne Manor Apartments, 152 F.R.D. 56, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1993) and Hall v.
Clifton Precision Inc., 150 F.R.D. 525, 531-32 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
18. Id.
19. Id.
[Vol. 19:367
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the defending attorney, who can no longer coach the witness. However, the
"no-consultation" order also silences defending attorneys from appropriately
protecting their clients. The balance of power shifts in the deposition. Unscrupu-
lous deposing attorneys can swiftly step into the power vacuum and ask irrelevant
and embarrassing questions. The defending attorney may object to the questions,
but he cannot take a break to explain the power shift to his client. As a result, the
defending attorney is powerless to advise his client about how to protect himself
from the new Rambo, the lawyer taking the deposition.
I now find myself in the uncomfortable position of changing my earlier
recommendation. I have come to the conclusion that these "no-consultation"
orders are dangerous to the attorney-client relationship and should not be entered.
Because federal courts have varied greatly in their approach to controlling
witness coaching in depositions, 20 I urge the United States Supreme Court to
adopt language in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to set a national standard
prohibiting trial courts from entering these blanket "no-consultation" orders. I
also urge state legislatures to repeal language in their respective rules of civil
procedure prohibiting consultations between attorneys and their deponents. The
harm these "no-consultation" orders and rules inflict on the attorney-client
relationship outweighs the benefit to the fact-finding process derived from
preventing the defending attorney and the witness from talking to each other once
the deposition begins. These "no-consultation" orders and rules have the
dangerous potential of transforming the deposing attorney into a "Rambo,"
fighting against a deponent whose attorney cannot properly protect him due to a
"no-consultation" order or rule.
Because witness coaching during depositions remains a problem, I also urge
the United States Supreme Court to amend Rule 30(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to prohibit consultations between a deponent and his or her
counsel once a question has been posed by the deposing attorney unless a
question of privilege has arisen. Although excessive consultations between the
lawyer defending the deposition and his deponent-client may certainly interfere
with the search for truth and inhibit a full and fair disclosure of the facts, a blanket
order or adoption of a rule prohibiting all attorney-client consultations after a
deposition begins intrudes too far into the attorney-client relationship. First, it
leaves deponents undefended and vulnerable to unscrupulous questioning by the
deposing attorney. Second, an absolute prohibition on attorney-client consulta-
tions may also prevent a lawyer from following her ethical duty to take
"reasonable measures" to counsel a client about correcting an unintentionally
false or misleading statement. 21 Third, a "no-consultation" rule prevents an
attorney from learning which questions she needs to ask the client at the end of
20. See infra Part IV.
21. MODEL RULES R. 3.3-3.4; see also State ex rel Means v. King, 520 S.E.2d 875, 882 (W. Va. 1999).
2006]
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the deposition in order to explain or correct earlier erroneous testimony. Fourth,
the "no-consultation" rule may actually hinder the search for truth by preventing
an attorney from checking with a client at breaks and recesses as to the accuracy
of the client's earlier testimony that may have resulted from a poorly worded
question or the client's misunderstanding of a question posed by the deposing
attorney. And finally, such a rule or order is unnecessary in light of other remedies
available to a judge who wishes to control witness coaching in the deposition
room.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE "No-CONSULTATION" ORDER
Before Judge Gawthrop entered his order in Hall in July 1993, courts and legal
commentators were scrambling to find a way to control Rambo tactics employed
by defending counsel in depositions. United States Supreme Court Justice Lewis
F. Powell had warned the practicing bar, after seeing a 26 volume, 3,000 page
deposition taken intermittently over a year, that he was seeing a pattern of
discovery abuse in cases coming before the Court: "As the years have passed,
discovery techniques and tactics have become a highly developed litigation
art-one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage of justice. 22 The Federal
Bar Counsel Committee on Second Circuit Courts studied problems with
depositions and published its findings in A Report on the Conduct of Depositions:
The genesis of this report is the frequently expressed belief among attorneys
who spend their time litigating in the federal courts in this Circuit that the
current method of taking and defending depositions is too often an exercise in
competitive obstructionism. The process frequently is wasteful and unproduc-
tive in view of the amount of time, effort and money that lawyers and their
clients spend participating in discovery disputes. Depositions have often
become theaters for posturing and maneuvering rather than efficient vehicles
for the discovery of relevant facts or the perpetuation of testimony....
Whatever standards currently exist for the conduct of depositions are fre-
quently neither followed by the participating attorneys nor enforced by the
courts. As a result, depositions are often no longer cost-effective devices for
obtaining discovery.23
When entering his "no-consultation" order, Judge Gawthrop framed the
witness coaching issue that presented itself in Hall as "to what extent may a
lawyer confer with a client, off the record and outside earshot of the other
lawyers, during a deposition of the client.",24 Judge Gawthrop then noted that he
22. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); see also McDonough v. Keniston,
188 F.R.D. 22 (D.N.H. 1998).
23. Fed. Bar Counsel Courts Comm. on Second Circuit Courts, A Report on the Conduct of Depositions, 131
F.R.D. 613,613 (1990).
24. Hall v. Clifton Precision Inc., 150 F.R.D. 525, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
[Vol. 19:367
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had found little case law on the subject of attorney conduct at depositions.
In Hall, the issue of witness coaching had arisen near the beginning of the
deposition of the plaintiff, Arthur Hall, when Robert F Stewart, defendant's
counsel, instructed the deponent, "Certainly ask me to clarify any question that
you do not understand. Or if you have any difficulty understanding my questions,
I'll be happy to try to rephrase them to make it possible for you to be able to
answer them." Hall's attorney, Joel W. Todd, then interjected: "Mr. Hall, at any
time if you want to stop and talk to me, all you have to do is indicate that to me.',
25
Mr. Stewart immediately responded, "This witness is here to give testimony, to
be answering my questions, and not to have conferences with counsel in order to
aid him in developing his responses to my questions. 26 Shortly after this
exchange, Mr. Hall interrupted the deposition to consult with his attorney
concerning the meaning of the word "document." A second interruption occurred
when Mr. Stewart showed Hall a document and proceeded to question him about
it. Hall's attorney, Mr. Todd, interrupted the questioning stating, "I've got to
review it with my client." Mr. Stewart then objected to Mr. Todd's reviewing
documents with his client, which Mr. Stewart was about to use in questioning the
deponent.27 At this point in the deposition, the parties contacted the court and
adjourned the deposition until the question of attorney-client conferences during
the deposition could be resolved.
Before ruling in the case, Judge Gawthrop asked for briefs from both sides and
reviewed his authority to enter an order controlling consultations between
counsel and the deponent. He found authority in then-Rule 26(f) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which "authorizes the court, after a discovery
conference, to enter an order 'setting limitations on discovery' and 'determining
other such matters ... as are necessary for the proper management of
discovery.", 28 He also looked to the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26 that
provided that "[discovery] abuse can best be prevented by intervention by the
court as soon as abuse is threatened. 29
Judge Gawthrop then looked to the language in Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure that governs oral depositions: "[e]xamination and cross-
examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial." He also looked
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 527. Although Rule 26(f) no longer contains the language authorizing a court to enter an order
"setting limitations on discovery" and "determining such other matters ... as are necessary for the proper
management of discovery" relied upon by Judge Gawthrop, the revised Rule 16(c)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure makes it clear that a trial judge still has the authority to enter an order concerning "the control
and scheduling of discovery." Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f) (1980), with FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(6). Therefore, a
trial court today still has the same control over the discovery process that a trial judge had in 1993 when Judge
Gawthrop entered his order in Hall. See 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2113, 2116 (2d ed. 1994).
29. Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 527.
2006]
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at the language in Rule 30(d) that "gives the court the power to terminate or limit
the scope of a deposition 'on motion of a party' if the court finds that the
deposition is being conducted in 'bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party."'' 30 Judge Gawthrop then
concluded that "[t]aken together, Rules 26(f), 30, and 37(a), along with Rule 16,
which gives the court control over pre-trial case management, vest the court with
broad authority and discretion to control discovery, including the conduct of
depositions. 31 Concluding that he had the authority to control conferences
between the deponent and his lawyer, Judge Gawthrop held:
A deposition is meant to be a question-and-answer conversation between the
deposing lawyer and the witness. There is no proper need for the witness's own
lawyer to act as an intermediary, interpreting questions, deciding which
questions the witness should answer, and helping the witness to formulate
answers.... It is the witness-not the lawyer-who is the witness. As an
advocate, the lawyer is free to frame those facts in a manner favorable to the
client, and also to make favorable and creative arguments of law. But the
lawyer is not entitled to be creative with the facts. Rather, a lawyer must accept
the facts as they develop. Therefore, I hold that a lawyer and client do not have
an absolute right to confer during the course of the client's deposition. 32
Anticipating problems with the implementation of his order, Judge Gawthrop
clarified that his order was not limited to the actual time that the deposition was in
session and "on the record." He prohibited all conferences during the taking of
testimony including conferences occurring during breaks in the deposition and
during overnight recesses:
Once the deposition has begun, the preparation period is over and the deposing
lawyer is entitled to pursue the chosen line of inquiry without interjection by
the witness's counsel. Private conferences are barred during the deposition, and
the fortuitous occurrence of a coffee break, lunch break, or evening recess is no
reason to change the rules. 33
Judge Gawthrop further explained that his order prohibiting attorney-witness
conferences during the deposition applied to all conferences, regardless of
whether they were initiated by the attorney or by the client.34
At the time of the order in Hall, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
silent concerning the issue of coaching witnesses during depositions. 35 But, five
months after the decision in Hall, Congress modified Rule 30 of the Federal
30. Id.
31. Id. (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 528.
33. Id. at 529.
34. Id. at 528.
35. See FaD. R. Cv. P. 30(d) (1988).
[Vol. 19:367
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Rules of Civil Procedure by adding the following language to Rule 30(d):
(1) Any objection to evidence during a deposition shall be stated concisely and
in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner. A party may instruct a
deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce
a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to present a motion under
paragraph (3).36
According to the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the 1993 amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this addition to Rule 30 occurred
because "[d]epositions frequently have been unduly prolonged, if not unfairly
frustrated, by lengthy objections and colloquy, often suggesting how the
deponent should respond. 37
To stop the coaching of witnesses, the drafters of the amendments to the Rules
of Civil Procedure chose to prohibit argumentative and suggestive objections, not
to eliminate all attorney-client conferences. The 1993 amendments to Rule 30
provided clear directives to defending attorneys to cease coaching their witnesses
through their lengthy "speaking objections" occurring on-the-record at the
deposition. The 1993 amendments did not attempt to control off-the-record
conversations between witnesses and their counsel occurring at the deposition,
nor did the amended rule attempt to control conversations between the attorney
and client occurring during breaks or overnight recesses. The drafters of the 1993
amendments to the Federal Rules chose not to go as far as Judge Gawthrop's
"no-consultation" order prohibiting conduct occurring off the record and often
out of the presence of the attorney taking the deposition.
III. COURTS ARE DIVIDED ON ADOPTION OF HALL V. CLIFTON PRECISION
GUIDELINES
Not surprisingly, courts in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where Hall
was decided, started seeing motions for sanctions and requests for authority to
conduct second depositions based on Judge Gawthrop's order in Hall. For
instance, in Johnson v. Wayne Manor Apartments, Judge J. Curtis Joyner of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania expressed agreement with Judge Gawthrop's
pronouncement that there is no need for a witness's lawyer to act as an
intermediary, interpreting questions and helping the witness formulate his
answers. 38 Judge Joyner granted plaintiff's request to conduct second depositions
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d) (1993). Rule 30(d) was further amended in 2000 to remove the references to "to
evidence" and "on evidence," but otherwise the 1993 version reflects the current rule. See FED. R. CIv. P.
30(d)(1) ("Any objection during a deposition must be stated concisely and in a non-argumentative and
non-suggestive manner. A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a
privilege, to enforce a limitation directed by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(4).").
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d) (1993) advisory committee's note.
38. 152 F.R.D. 56, 59 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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of two of the defendants and ordered defendants and their counsel to pay plaintiff
and her counsel $1,314.20 in sanctions. In that case, Judge Joyner reviewed the
partial depositions that had been conducted and found that, as a result of
defendant's "objections" during the first deposition, "what plaintiff's counsel has
effectively 'discovered' is the opinion and concomitant testimony of the
defendant's attorney."
39
Two years later, Judge Joyner cited Hall with approval in Frazier v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority: "we held that there is no
right for a lawyer and witness to confer during the course of the deposition ....
We concluded that 'lawyers are strictly prohibited from making any comments,
either on or off the record, which might suggest or limit a witness's answer to an
unobjectionable question.' 40 In Frazier, Judge Joyner granted defendant's
motion to compel the re-deposition of the plaintiff, concluding that during the
initial deposition, plaintiff's lawyer had "repeatedly interrupted the deposition,
suggesting answers to the witness, cutting short the witness's responses to
questioning, and instructing the witness, without basis, not to answer certain
questions. 41 In both Frazier and O'Brien v. Amtrak,42 Judge Joyner adopted the
Hall guidelines and allowed second depositions as a result of defending counsel's
conduct during the initial depositions.43
Similarly, after reviewing transcripts of several depositions, United States
Magistrate Judge Edwin E. Naythons from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
relied on Hall in his instructions for future depositions: "Therefore, once the
deposition has begun, the preparation period is over and the deposing lawyer is
entitled to pursue the chosen line of inquiry without interjection by the witness'
counsel." 44
Judges in other jurisdictions also began to adopt the Hall guidelines.45 Judge
Charles A. Shaw from the Eastern District of Missouri cited Hall with approval
when he implemented a series of deposition guidelines similar to those imposed
in Hall in a case in which plaintiff's two attorneys had "repeatedly instructed
their client not to answer a question; interposed 'objections' which were then
incorporated by Plaintiff into his answers; restated questions in order to 'clarify'
them for Plaintiff; and whispered with, and pointed out portions of documents to
Plaintiff. ,4
6
39. Id.
40. Frazier v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 161 F.R.D. 309, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (quoting Hall v. Clifton Precision
Inc., 150 F.R.D. 525,531 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
41. Id. at 316.
42. 163 F.R.D. 232 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
43. See id. at 236.
44. Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint, No. 94-CV-4603, 1995 WL 79237, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1995).
45. See Plaisted v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 210 F.R.D. 527 (M.D. Pa. 2002); Fisher v. Goord, 184 F.R.D. 45,48
(W.D.N.Y 1999); Armstrong v. Hussmann, Inc., 163 ER.D. 299 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
46. Armstrong, 163 F.R.D. at 301.
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Judge James F. McClure, Jr. from the Middle District of Pennsylvania adopted
the Hall guidelines in Plaisted v. Geisinger Medical Center, noting that although
the Third Circuit (presiding over the Hall court) had not yet addressed the issue,
he was going to adopt the Hall guidelines for attorney behavior at depositions.47
In Plaisted, defense counsel had left a deposition to consult with her client two
different times while a question was pending. In response to plaintiff's motion to
compel answers to those questions, "defense counsel denie[d] that a question was
pending" when she took the breaks, even though "[tlhe first sentence on the
record after the first break is plaintiffs' counsel asking [the witness] if he
remembered the question," and "[t]he first sentence on the record after the second
break is defense counsel asking 'Do you want to read back the last question? I
think there had been a question pending.',
4 8
The Supreme Court of South Carolina likewise relied on Hall when it alerted
the South Carolina Bar to the enactment of Rule 30(j) of the South Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure: "Our Rule 30(j), SCRCP, is derived from Judge Robert S.
Gawthrop's seminal opinion in Hall [v.] Clifton Precision. Having adopted the
Hall approach, our Court requires attorneys in South Carolina to operate under
one of the most sweeping and comprehensive rules on deposition conduct in the
nation."49
Not all courts embraced the Hall guidelines. The United States District Court
for the District of Columbia specifically refused to allow the defendant's attorney
to re-depose the plaintiff regarding a conversation between the plaintiff and his
attorney during a recess at plaintiff's deposition. The court pointed out that
defendant's motion for sanctions relied entirely on Hall and its progeny in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and went on to say: "Hall, a case that is
distinguishable on its facts to the instant action, is instructive, but this District has
not adopted nor is it bound by the litany of deposition restrictions and
prohibitions it outlines. 5 °
Judge R. Stanton Wettick, of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County, Civil Division, refused to implement the Hall guidelines even
though he agreed that plaintiff's counsel had frequently interrupted the question-
ing by raising objections and instructing the plaintiff not to answer various
questions on topics unrelated to a question of privilege.5'
I choose not to follow the Hall v. Clifton Precision guidelines because (1) they
prohibit counsel for a party being deposed from raising objections that our
47. See Plaisted, 201 F.R.D. at 532.
48. Id. at 534-35.
49. In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10, 16 (S.C. 2001) (internal citation omitted). For the
text of Rule 30(j) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, see supra note 7.
50. Odone v. Croda Int'l PLC, 170 FR.D. 66, 68 (D.D.C. 1997) (footnote omitted).
51. See Acri v. Golden Triangle Mgmt. Acceptance Co., No. G.D. 93-12188 (Ct. Com. P1. Alleghany County
1994), printed in 142 PI rSBuRGH LEGAL J 225, 226 (1994).
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discovery rules specifically allow; (2) they provide insufficient protection to the
deponent; (3) they can produce results that could not have been intended; (4)
they fail to recognize the proper role of counsel; (5) they increase the burden
and expense of litigation; and (6) they are not necessary to curb the discovery
abuses which are described in the Hall v. Clifton Precision opinion.52
In his opinion, Judge Wettick discussed each of these six problems with the Hall
opinion. He concluded his discussion with a comment that if he thought there
were a large number of lawyers trying to thwart the discovery process, he would
agree with Judge Gawthrop that courts must develop different approaches, but his
experience had shown that a high percentage of lawyers in Allegheny County
were complying with the letter and spirit of the discovery rules.53
United States Magistrate Judge Robert Hunt from Nevada also refused to
implement the Hall guidelines.54 He was troubled by the way the Hall guidelines
impinged on the right to counsel.55 Judge Hunt noted that he had been unable to
find any decision by any court within the Ninth Circuit that addressed prohibiting
an attorney from speaking to his or her client/witness during recesses at trial or
during regularly scheduled recesses at depositions.56 He concluded: "While this
Court agrees with the Hall court's identification of the problem, it feels Hall goes
too far in its solution."57 Judge Hunt proposed a much narrower rule limiting
attorney-deponent consultations only when a question has been posed by the
deposing attorney, but not yet answered by the witness. He suggested:
If [breaks] are requested by the deponent or deponent's counsel, and the
interrogating attorney is in the middle of a question, or is following a line of
questions which should be completed, the break should be delayed until a
question is answered or a line of questions has been given a reasonable time to
be pursued.58
United States Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland also refused to adopt the Hall
guidelines in their entirety. He noted, "The Hall case has met with substantial, and I
believe justified, criticism.' 59 Thus, while he did prohibit deponents and their counsel
from conferring with each other at the deposition while a question was pending (except
for the purpose of determining whether to assert a privilege), he broke with Hall when
he decided that deponents and their counsel may confer during periodic deposition
breaks, including luncheons and overnight recesses.6°
52. Id. at 228.
53. Id. at 230.
54. In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 614 (D. Nev. 1998).
55. See id. at 620.
56. See id. at 621.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. McKinley Infuser, Inc. v. Zdeb, 200 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D. Colo. 2001).
60. Id.
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IV. JUDICIAL ORDERS RESTRICTING ATrORNEY-CLIENT CONFERENCES
DURING A DEPOSITION VARY GREATLY
Judges and legal commentators have had a hard time establishing whether it is
proper for deponents and their attorneys to confer during the taking of testimony
at a deposition or during breaks in the deposition. The restrictions vary from an
absence of any mention of attorney-deponent conferences (presumably allowing
all conferences), to an absolute prohibition against all attorney-deponent
conferences in jurisdictions that have adopted Judge Gawthrop's deposition
guidelines announced in Hall. In this section of the article, I will discuss the
various restrictions on witness-attorney conferences that courts have imposed,
starting with the least restrictive and culminating with the most restrictive
prohibitions.
A. REFUSAL TO RESTRICT ATTORNEY-DEPONENT CONFERENCES
When asked to enter an order finding that there had been improper coaching
when a witness twice consulted his attorney before answering a question, Judge
Joan Humphrey Lefkow of the Northern District of Illinois carefully reviewed
Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and found there was "no rule that
prohibits a witness from consulting with counsel before the witness answers a
question."''6 The issue had arisen in a deposition of a witness designated under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) to be the corporate representative of the
bank. The first time the witness consulted with his attorney there was no question
pending. The second conference occurred when the witness was asked about his
personal affairs, a matter outside the knowledge of the bank and thus outside the
scope of the subpoena. The court refused to award fees or expenses, determining
that objections to both questions were well founded and that it was appropriate
for the witness to consult with his attorney prior to answering either question.62
B. RESTRICTION OF ATTORNEY-DEPONENT CONFERENCES ONLY WHEN
DOCUMENTS ARE SHOWN TO DEPONENT
Judge Norman in the Middle District of Georgia entered an order prohibiting
witness-coaching during all future depositions of fact-witnesses in Collins v.
International Dairy Queen, Inc.63 Although he ordered counsel not to make any
objections or statements which might suggest an answer to the witness, he
restricted attorney-client conferences during a deposition in only one situation,
stating that attorneys and their witnesses "do not have the right to discuss
61. Circle Group Internet, Inc. v. Atlas, Pearlman, Trop & Borkson, P.A., No. 03 C 9004,2004 WL406988,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2004).
62. Id. at *2-3.
63. No. CIV. A. 94-95-4MACWDO, 1998 WL 293314, at *3 (M.D. Ga. June 14, 1998).
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documents privately before the witness answers questions about them." ' Other
than this reference to off-the-record attorney-client consultations concerning a
document, Judge Norman did not explicitly restrict any other attorney-client
conferences during a deposition. He did not restrict attorneys or their clients from
initiating conferences at any time, including when a question had been asked, but
not yet answered.
C. ATTORNEY-DEPONENT CONFERENCES PROHIBITED WHEN INITIATED
BY DEFENDING ATIORNEY
Three years before Judge Gawthrop's order in Hall, the Federal Bar Counsel
Committee on Second Circuit Courts issued A Report on the Conduct of
Depositions.65 Although this report condemned the "current method" of taking
and defending depositions as "too often an exercise in competitive obstruction-
ism," 66 the report recommended a prohibition on attorney-client conferences in
only one situation: when initiated by a defending attorney (unless the conference
is for the purpose of determining whether a privilege should be asserted).
The Committee's view is that attorney-client conferences should be kept to a
minimum. Certainly, the defending attorney should not initiate a conference
during the pendency of a question except to determine whether a privilege
should be asserted. Attorney-initiated conferences for any other purpose during
the pendency of a question are presumptively improper and continued
conferences are sanctionable.67
Although the report urges that attorney-deponent conferences "be kept to a
minimum, '68 the Committee of the Second Circuit did not actually recommend a
prohibition on conferences initiated by the client after a question has been posed.
The Committee also did not prohibit attorney-deponent conferences during
regularly scheduled breaks or overnight recesses.
United States Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman of the Southern District of New
York followed the same reasoning when he determined that "consultation
between counsel and a witness at a deposition raises questions only when the
consultation is initiated by counsel."69 The court went on to approve witness-
initiated consultations: "[a] witness is generally free to consult with counsel at
any time during a deposition. 7 °
64. Id.
65. See Fed. Bar Counsel Courts Comm. on Second Circuit Courts, A Report on the Conduct of Depositions,
131 F.R.D. 613 (1990).
66. Id. at 613.
67. Id. at 618.
68. Id.
69. Okoumou v. Safe Horizon, No. 03 Civ. 1606LAKHBP, 2004 WL 2149118 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2004).
70. Id.
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D. ATrORNEY-DEPONENT CONFERENCES PROHIBITED WHILE A
QUESTION IS PENDING
The year before the entry of the Hall "no-consultation" order, Bankruptcy
Judge C. Timothy Corcoran drafted detailed guidelines for the taking of
depositions before the Orlando Division of the United States Bankruptcy Court in
the Middle District of Florida. He went a step further than the Second Circuit and
in In re Braniff, Inc. prohibited all attorney-deponent conferences during a
deposition while a question is pending, except to determine if a claim of privilege
should be asserted:
(d) Private consultation. Private conferences between deponents and their
attorneys during the actual taking of the deposition are improper when a
question is pending except for the purpose of determining whether a privilege
or claim of confidentiality should be asserted. Unless prohibited by the court
for good cause shown, such conferences may however be held during normal
recesses and adjournments.7 1
Judge Corcoran did not distinguish between attorney-initiated and client-initiated
conferences. Instead, he prohibited any conferences while a question is pending
in the deposition.
In 1998, United States Magistrate Judge Hunt in Nevada also refused to adopt
the Hall v. Clifton Precision guidelines in In re Stratosphere Corporate Securities
Litigation, but he did enter an order prohibiting conferences when a question is
pending:
This Court agrees with the Hall court that a questioning attorney is entitled to
have the witness, and the witness alone, answer questions. When there is a
question pending neither the deponent nor his or her counsel may initiate the
interruption of the proceeding to confer about the question, the answer, or about
any document that is being examined, except to assert a claim of privilege.7 2
Judge Hunt did not prohibit deponent-attorney conferences during recesses or
overnight adjournments.
In McKinley Infuser, Inc. v. Zdeb, Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland adopted
the reasoning of Judge Hunt in In re Stratosphere, concluding:
I agree with the reasoning of In re Stratosphere and our local rule 30. 1C that...
the truth finding function is adequately protected if deponents are prohibited
from conferring with their counsel while a question is pending; other
71. In re Braniff, Inc., Nos. 89-03325-BKC-6C1, 92-911, 1992 WL 261641, at *14 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Oct. 2,
1992).
72. In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D. Nev. 1998) (citation omitted) (noting also
that an interruption is proper to conform to a court order or to seek a protective order).
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consultations, during periodic deposition breaks, luncheon and overnight
recesses, and more prolonged recesses ordinarily are appropriate.73
Judge Boland reasoned that the plaintiffs were worried that allowing the
deponent to talk with his counsel at breaks might result in a decision by defense
counsel to question his own witness at the close of the deposition. Plaintiffs
appeared to fear that the deponent might alter his prior deposition testimony
when responding to questions from his own counsel thereby resulting in a less
advantageous record for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also appeared to fear that, when
answering the defending attorney's questions at the end of the deposition, the
deponent might raise disputed issues of fact thereby precluding entry of summary
judgment for the plaintiffs. Although the court acknowledged plaintiffs' argu-
ments, it permitted consultations between counsel and the deponent at breaks and
overnight recesses because "[flact-finding is a two-way street, however, and each
party must be allowed to develop the facts of the case in any appropriate
manner."
74
As noted above, a number of courts, while prohibiting consultations during the
deposition itself, permit attorney-client conferences during breaks in the deposi-
tion. Thus, in 1990, Judge Marvin H. Shoob entered an order in the United States
District Court in the Northern District of Georgia with wording that was very
similar to that used by Judge Corcoran in In re Braniff, Inc.:
(d) Private consultation. Private conferences between deponents and their
attorneys during the actual taking of the deposition are improper except for the
purpose of determining whether a privilege should be asserted. Unless
prohibited by the Court for good cause shown, such conferences may be held
during recesses or adjournments.75
E. PROHIBITION ON ALL ATrORNEY-DEPONENT CONFERENCES AT
BREAKS AND OVERNIGHT RECESSES WHEN DEPOSITION IS HELD ON
CONSECUTIVE DAYS
Judge Gladys Kessler of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia found that even though there were "constitutional overtones and
concerns about any interference with or limitation on the ability of counsel to
confer with her witnesses (whether client or not),",76 nonetheless, "the importance
of ensuring that depositions are free from impermissible coaching"77 required
73. McKinley Infuser, Inc. v. Zdeb, 200 F.R.D. 648, 650 (D. Colo. 2001).
74. Id. at 651.
75. In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., Nos. 1:90-CV-2485-MHS, MDL 861, 1990 WL 358009, at *9
(N.D. Ga. Dec. 21, 1990). For Judge Corcoran's order in In re Braniff, Inc., see supra text accompanying note
69.
76. United States v. Phillip Morris Inc., 212 F.R.D. 418,420 (D.D.C. 2002).
77. Id.
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some restriction of attorney-witness conferences. After reviewing the prohibition
of all attorney-witness conferences imposed in Hall, Judge Kessler opted to
prohibit all conferences "if there is no temporal interruption and the deposition is
continued on a day-to-day basis with no intervening passage of time."'T In other
words, witnesses and lawyers were prohibited from all communications once the
deposition began unless the deposition continued to another day that was
non-consecutive. In that situation, attorneys and their witnesses could talk during
the intervening time period. She found it was inappropriate to impose an absolute
prohibition on all communications between counsel and a witness in cases such
as the one at issue (where the United States had brought suit against numerous
tobacco companies to recover health care expenses for smoking related illnesses)
when the depositions exceeded the presumptive seven hours and continued over a
lengthy period of non-consecutive days due to the deposition schedules of all the
lawyers involved in the case.7 9
The drafters of the Delaware Rules of Civil Procedure imposed a similar
prohibition on all consultations between a deponent and his or her counsel:
From the commencement until the conclusion of a deposition, including any
recesses or continuances thereof of less than five calendar days, the attorney(s)
for the deponent shall not: (A) consult or confer with the deponent regarding
the substance of the testimony already given or anticipated to be given except
for the purpose of conferring on whether to assert a privilege against testifying
80or on how to comply with a court order ....
In other words, counsel and the deponent could confer if there was a recess in the
deposition of longer than five days; with recesses of shorter duration, no
conferences were permitted.
R PROHIBITION ON ALL AT7ORNEY-DEPONENT CONSULTATIONS
Judge Gawthrop imposed the most extreme, and the most easily understood
limits on witness coaching. He prohibited all conferences between attorneys and
their client-deponents unless the conference was to determine if an objection
based on the existence of privilege should be asserted.8 He pointedly did not
make an exception for client-initiated requests for consultation, nor did he allow
conferences during a luncheon recess or an overnight recess.8 2 As far as he was
concerned, once the deposition started, all discussions between attorneys and
their deponent-clients had to stop. 83 The advantage of his rule is that it is easily
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. DEL. SUPER. CT. R. Crv. P. 30(d)(1).
81. See Hall v. Clifton Precision Inc., 150 F.R.D. 525, 531-532 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
82. See id. at 526.
83. See id.
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stated and easily understood. Judge Gawthrop also defined the punishment for
violation of his order: any conferences held in violation of the prohibition could
be inquired into by opposing counsel.84 Thus, any attorney-client conference
after the deposition had started explicitly lost the cloak of the attorney-client
privilege.
V. FLAWED REASONING BEHIND THE PROHIBITION ON
AT-ORNEY-DEPONENT CONSULTATIONS
Judge Gawthrop's reasoning in prohibiting attorney-deponent consultations
during a deposition is flawed in three respects. In this section of the article, I will
discuss each of these flaws and articulate why attorney-deponent conferences
should not be prohibited once the deposition begins.
A. JUDICIAL PRESENCE AT TRIAL
First, Judge Gawthrop erred when he stated that "depositions generally are to
be conducted under the same testimonial rules as are trials."85 In his order in Hall,
Judge Gawthrop used the wording of Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to justify equating the conduct of a deposition to the conduct of a trial.
Citing the language in Rule 30(c) that "[e]xamination and cross-examination of
witnesses [at a deposition] may proceed as permitted at the trial," 86 Judge
Gawthrop concluded that the method of conducting a deposition must mimic the
conduct of a trial. However, Rule 30 does not say the conduct of a deposition
shall be the same as the conduct of a trial, but only that the "[e]xamination and
cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial."87
When analyzing the wording of this portion of Rule 30(c), commentators
Wright, Miller, and Marcus state, "Rule 30(c) further directs that the
examination and cross-examination proceed as permitted at trial, so that
leading questions are allowed with adverse witnesses. 88 If the language, the
"examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted
at the trial," refers only to the types of questions that are permissible during
the deposition of an adverse witness and not to the method of conducting the
entire deposition, Judge Gawthrop erred in his sweeping conclusion that
depositions "generally are to be conducted under the same testimonial rules
as are trials."'89 By equating depositions with trials, Judge Gawthrop failed to
appreciate the great difference between the two: there is no judge present at
84. See id. at 531-32.
85. Id. at 528.
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c).
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (emphasis added).
88. WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 28, § 2113.
89. Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 528.
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the deposition. Judge Gawthrop's conclusion that depositions must mimic
trials is overbroad.
B. CONSULTATIONS DURING TRIAL TESTIMONY
The second flaw in Judge Gawthrop's reasoning is his deceptively obvious
assertion that a deponent and his attorney cannot request a break in the deposition
to confer because "[d]uring a civil trial, a witness and his or her lawyer are not
permitted to confer at their pleasure during the witness's testimony." 90 However,
Judge Gawthrop's conclusion does not necessarily follow.
We can all agree that in the middle of the trial, a witness and a lawyer do not
have the right to take a break whenever they wish to confer. However, most trial
attorneys are familiar with the situation in which a witness testifying at trial
becomes visibly confused or upset by a question or series of questions. The
lawyer representing that witness may then request a recess to permit the witness
to compose him or herself. Although the judge is not required to grant the
requested recess, many judges will permit the witness to take a break, leave the
stand, get a drink of water, and seek reassurance from counsel before resuming
the testimony.
If the same situation arises at the deposition, there is no judge present to protect
the witness and declare a recess. The lawyer representing the deponent is then in
the difficult position of either demanding a break to calm the witness, thereby
angering the deposing attorney, or permitting the visibly upset witness to
continue answering questions under oath. The attorney representing the deponent
may realize that most trial judges would permit a break at this point in the
testimony if the questioning were occurring during a trial. Judge Gawthrop's
statement that "[diuring a civil trial, a witness and his or her lawyer are not
permitted to confer at their pleasure during the witness's testimony"9 is therefore
an oversimplification and in many cases not in accordance with reality.
Furthermore, a witness at a deposition may need reassurance from counsel
even more than witnesses at trial do because there is no judge present at the
deposition to rule that certain personal questions are irrelevant or argumentative.
At a trial, the judge may sustain an objection to irrelevant or argumentative
questions. The witness who is testifying at trial then does not have to answer the
question. If the same situation arises at the deposition, the witness has to answer
the question unless the question delves into a privileged matter 92 or "a showing
that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent., 93 Because there is
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. FED. R. Crv. P. 30(d)(1).
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(4).
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no judge at the deposition to protect the witness from irrelevant or argumentative
questions, the deponent may become more distraught at a deposition than at trial
and may need a break to confer with counsel even more than at trial. Judge
Gawthrop's order prohibiting consultations between deponents and their attor-
neys is predicated on equating a deposition with a trial and does not recognize the
profound difference between the two: the presence of a judge at a trial and not at a
deposition.
C. CONSULTATIONS DURING REGULARLY SCHEDULED TRIAL RECESSES
The third flaw in Judge Gawthrop's reasoning is his conclusion that witnesses
and their lawyers are not permitted to talk during regularly scheduled breaks and
overnight recesses during trial, and therefore, the same rules should apply at
depositions. In Hall, Judge Gawthrop explained his conclusion: "During a civil
trial, a witness and his or her lawyer are not permitted to confer at their pleasure
during the witness's testimony. Once a witness has been prepared and has taken
the stand, that witness is on his or her own."94
Contrary to Judge Gawthrop's conclusion, courts appear to vary greatly on the
issue of whether attorneys may talk to their clients during regularly scheduled
breaks and overnight recesses during their trial testimony.95 Although some
courts have entered orders prohibiting lawyers and witness-clients from confer-
ring during trial court recesses,96 those rulings are the exception.97 The mere fact
that those courts thought they needed to enter an order prohibiting contact
demonstrates that the usual practice is to allow contact between witnesses and
their counsel during the witness's trial testimony. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not prohibit contact between testifying witnesses and their counsel
during regularly scheduled breaks or overnight recesses in a trial, and the United
States Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue in a civil case.
1. PROHIBITIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES
In a criminal case, the United States Supreme Court found that it was
"common practice" for defendants and their counsel to discuss the trial during
94. Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 528 (footnote omitted).
95. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 93 (1976); Aieilo v. City of Wilmington, 623 F.2d 845, 858-59
(3d Cir. 1980); Reynolds v. Ala. Dep't of Transp., 4 F Supp. 1055 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Thompson v. Atl. Bldg.
Corp., 107 A.2d 784 (D.C. 1954); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Danekas, 433 N.E.2d 736, 741 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982); Stocker Hinge Mfg. Co. v. Darnel Indus., Inc., 377 N.E.2d 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
96. Aiello, 623 F.2d at 858-59; Reynolds, 4 F. Supp. 1055; Stocker Hinge Mfg. Co., 377 N.E.2d 1125;
Commonwealth Edison Co., 433 N.E.2d at 741.
97. Geders, 425 U.S. at 96; cf. Thompson, 107 A.2d 784 (noting prohibition on attorney-client conferences
during trial has arisen few times).
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overnight recesses. In Geders v. United States,98 the United States Supreme Court
examined a trial court's order prohibiting contact between a criminal defendant
and his counsel during a seventeen hour overnight recess occurring between the
witness's direct and cross examination. The Supreme Court concluded:
It is common practice during such recesses for an accused and counsel to
discuss the events of the day's trial. Such recesses are often times of intensive
work, with tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed. The
lawyer may need to obtain from his client information made relevant by the
day's testimony, or he may need to pursue inquiry along lines not fully explored
earlier. At the very least, the overnight recess during trial gives the defendant a
chance to discuss with counsel the significance of the day's events. Our cases
recognize that the role of counsel is important precisely because ordinarily a
defendant is ill-equipped to understand and deal with the trial process without a
lawyer's guidance. 99
The Court in Geders unanimously reversed the defendant's conviction and
held that the conflict between the defendant's right to consult with his attorney
and the prosecutor's desire to cross-examine the defendant without intervention
of counsel had to be resolved in favor of the right to assistance and guidance of
counsel:'°° "We hold that an order preventing petitioner from consulting his
counsel 'about anything' during a 17-hour overnight recess between his direct
and cross-examination impinged upon his right to the assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."10'
Although the Court expressly refused to apply its ruling to all trial recesses in
all circumstances stating, "[w]e need not reach, and we do not deal with
limitations imposed in other circumstances," 10 2 the Court declared:
There are other ways to deal with the problem of possible improper influence
on testimony or "coaching" of a witness short of putting a barrier between
client and counsel for so long a period as 17 hours. The opposing counsel in the
adversary system is not without weapons to cope with "coached" witnesses.
103
The Court then suggested that the prosecutor could use skillful cross-examination
techniques to challenge the credibility of the "coached" defendant without having
to resort to asking the judge to impose an order prohibiting contact between the
defendant and his attorney during an overnight break in the trial.'
4
The D.C. Circuit confronted a slightly different trial court order in Mudd v.
98. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
99. Id. at 88.
100. Id. at 91.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 89.
104. Id. at 89-90.
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United States.10 5 In that case the trial court had instructed the defendant's
criminal attorney: "You are not to talk to Mr. Mudd about his testimony between
now and the time he undergoes his cross-examination. You can talk to him about
other things, but not about his testimony."10 6 Defendant appealed his conviction
contending that the order preventing him from talking to his attorney denied him
effective assistance of counsel. The government argued that Mr. Mudd's case was
distinguishable from Geders because the trial court in Geders had prohibited all
consultations between counsel and his client during the overnight recess while
the trial court in Mr. Mudd's case prohibited only discussions about the witness's
testimony. The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the government's position and ruled:
While the order in this case was indeed more limited than the one in Geders, the
interference with sixth amendment rights was not significantly diminished.
Even though Mudd was free to discuss strategy and tactics, there are obvious,
legitimate reasons he may have needed to consult with counsel about his
upcoming cross-examination. For example, Mudd's lawyer may have wanted
to warn defendant about certain questions that would raise self-incrimination
concerns, or questions that could lead Mudd to mention excluded evidence.
More generally, defendant may have needed advice on demeanor or speaking
style, a task made more difficult if specific testimony could not be mentioned.
While many of the benefits of counsel outlined by Geders are not related to
testimony per se, an order such as the one in this case can have a chilling effect
on cautious attorneys, who might avoid giving advice on non-testimonial
matters for fear of violating the court's directive. Consultation between lawyers
and clients cannot be neatly divided into discussion about "testimony" and
those about "other" matters. 1o7
The D.C. Circuit accordingly vacated Mr. Mudd's criminal conviction based on a
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the trial court
prevented the defendant from talking with his lawyer about his testimony during
an overnight break in the trial.
Thirteen years after the decision in Geders, in the case Perry v. Leeke, a
criminal defendant challenged an order prohibiting him from consulting with his
attorney during a fifteen minute break in his trial.10 8 The trial court had taken a
short break between the direct examination and the cross-examination of the
defendant and prohibited any contact between the defendant and his counsel
during this break. The United States Supreme Court determined that the order
preventing contact during the fifteen minute break did not violate the defendant's
constitutional rights.,0 9
105. 798 F2d 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
106. Id. at 1510.
107. Id. at 1511.
108. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
109. Id.
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The difference between the Supreme Court's decisions in Geders and Perry
appears to be the length of the break or recess and the substance of the
conversations anticipated to occur. In both cases, the recess was called at the end
of the direct examination and before the cross examination of the criminal
defendant. In Geders, the Supreme Court ruled that the order prohibiting contact
between the defendant and his counsel during a seventeen-hour overnight recess
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Perry, the Court
determined that the prohibition on contact between the defendant and his counsel
during a fifteen-minute recess did not violate the defendant's constitutional
rights. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Perry, attempted to explain the
different rulings by describing the different content of the anticipated conversa-
tions between the defendant and his attorney during the two recesses. Describing
the anticipated conversation between counsel and the defendant during the
fifteen-minute recess, Justice Stevens stated: "[I]t is appropriate to presume that
nothing but the testimony will be discussed."' l He contrasted that predicted
conversation with the likely content of the conversation occurring during a
seventeen-hour recess:
[T]he normal consultation between attorney and client that occurs during an
overnight recess would encompass matters that go beyond the content of the
defendant's own testimony-matters that the defendant does have a constitu-
tional right to discuss with his lawyer, such as the availability of other
witnesses, trial tactics, or even the possibility of negotiating a plea bargain. 
11
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order in Perry
prohibiting the defendant and his counsel from talking during a fifteen minute
recess in his testimony did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights in the
same manner as did the trial court's seventeen hour prohibition on consultation in
Geders.
2. PROMITImONS IN CIVIL CASES
In the civil arena, judges have struggled to define if and when a court may
prohibit contact between a testifying party and his counsel during trial. The
United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of court orders
prohibiting contact between the witness and lawyer in the civil context. In
Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co.,1 12 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a lower court's decision prohibiting counsel from communicating with a
party-witness during an overnight recess in a civil trial. The Fifth Circuit noted
that even though there was "a paucity of authority dealing with the existence of a
110. Id. at 284.
111. Id.
112. 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
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right to counsel in civil cases," ' 1 3 the United States Supreme Court had indicated
in its criminal decisions that the right to counsel in the civil arena "is implicit in
the concept of fifth amendment due process."' 1 4 The court then concluded that if
a civil litigant has a constitutional right to retain hired counsel, a trial judge's
prohibiting consultation between counsel and his client during an overnight
recess impinged upon that right. 115 The Fifth Circuit found that this violation of a
constitutional right constituted a ground for reversal of the judgment, stating:
Our analysis of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
establishes that a civil litigant has a constitutional right to retain hired counsel.
Because the prohibiting of communication between a testifying party-witness
and his attorney during an overnight recess in the party-witness' testimony
impinges on that constitutional right, we are compelled to reverse.
116
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals arrived at a different conclusion in Aiello v.
City of Wilmington, when it examined whether a trial judge could restrict
communication between an attorney and his client during the period when the
client is under cross-examination at trial. 1 7 The Third Circuit noted that "[t]he
extension of the Geders rule to civil cases is an interesting but troublesome
question that has been addressed only infrequently by the courts and not at all by
commentators."' 18 The Third Circuit distinguished the case before it from
Potashnick by pointing out that the defendant in the instant case was given an
opportunity to talk with his counsel for ten minutes prior to cross-examination
and chose not to do so. Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that the district court
did not commit reversible error in light of the facts.
Some courts have focused on the content of the anticipated conversation
between counsel and client as the determinative factor in deciding whether there
is a constitutional right for the testifying civil party to confer with his retained
attorney during breaks in the trial. When confronted with the issue of whether a
court could prohibit a party from conferring with counsel during breaks in his
trial testimony, United States District Court Judge Myron Thompson noted that
although a party who is testifying at trial does not have a right to consult his
counsel about any matter at any time during the course of his testimony," 9 the
testifying party does have a right to confer with his counsel when he is discussing
the strategy of the case as a whole as distinguished from his trial testimony:
113. Id. at 1117.
114. Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) and Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925)).
115. Id. at 1118.
116. Id. at 1104.
117. Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 623 F.2d 845, 858 (3d Cir. 1980).
118. Id.
119. Reynolds v. Ala. Dep't ofTransp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1066 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
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[T]he trial court has broad power to control the progress of testimony before it.
This broad power is, however, limited by a testifying party's right to engage in
such non-testimonial matters as giving and receiving information and working
on the presentation of his or her case through strategizing, developing tactics,
and generally managing the progress of the case. Because these non-
testimonial matters arise most often during extended recesses-in particular,
over evenings and weekends-the court must be sensitive to allow a testifying
party to confer with his or her attorney during such periods.
12 0
Judge Thompson then concluded he would continue his policy of prohibiting
attorneys from talking to witnesses during breaks in trial testimony. 12' However,
he agreed to make exceptions to that rule when the witness was testifying on
several topics at different times during the trial.122 Judge Thompson found that
the witness was subject to the rule prohibiting consultation while testifying only
during his testimony about the individual topic he was discussing at that point in
the trial.' 23 He permitted the witness to confer with his attorney about
non-testimonial matters during evenings and weekends. 124 Finally, the court said
it would even consider permitting additional consultations on a case-by-case
basis.
125
Other federal district courts have arrived at different conclusions regarding
consultations between testifying witnesses and their trial counsel. When asked to
prohibit counsel from talking with his witness during any breaks in a deposition,
United States Magistrate Judge Hunt researched civil cases in which trial courts
had been asked to prohibit counsel from talking with a witness during the course
of a civil trial. Magistrate Judge Hunt was unable to find a single case in the Ninth
Circuit that "precludes counsel from speaking to his or her client/witness during
recesses called by the court during trial or during regularly scheduled recesses of
depositions., 126 Magistrate Judge Hunt then explained his understanding of the
right of witnesses to confer with their attorneys during a trial: "It is this Court's
experience, at the bar and on the bench, that attorney's [sic] and clients regularly
confer during trial and even during the client's testimony, while the court is in
recess, be it mid morning or mid afternoon, the lunch recess, are [sic] the evening
recess." 127 Based on his experience and his research, Judge Hunt refused to enter
an order governing future depositions that would prevent an attorney from
consulting with his or her witness-deponent during a recess not requested by
counsel.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1067.
122. Id. at 1060.
123. Id. at 1067.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D. Nev. 1998).
127. Id.
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When Judge Gladys Kessler, United States District Court Judge for the District
of Columbia, was asked to impose the Hall guidelines on depositions being taken
in the tobacco litigation, she concluded there were "clearly constitutional
overtones and concerns about any interference with or limitation on the ability of
counsel to confer with her witnesses .... ,128 After researching the issue of
prohibiting contact between deponents and their counsel, Judge Kessler stated:
First, it should be noted that there is a paucity of governing case law in this
area. The D.C. Circuit has not spoken on the issue, so far as this Court could
find, and the briefs offer no such authority. The two Supreme Court cases relied
on by Defendant-Perry v. Leeke and Geders v. United States-while
appearing to be relevant at first glance turn out upon more careful analysis, to
provide little or no guidance. They are both criminal cases and therefore raise
Constitutional issues under the Sixth Amendment that are obviously not present
in this case. 129
State courts have also confronted the issue of whether counsel may consult
with a testifying witness during a break in a trial. The West Virginia Supreme
Court decided that "[w]hile it is clear that a criminal defendant enjoys the right to
confer with his attorney during the course of his trial testimony, such an
encompassing right does not apply to a party in a civil trial."' 130 The West Virginia
Supreme Court did acknowledge that other courts have differed with its
conclusion and have found the rule in Geders applies to civil trials as well.131
These cases show judges struggling to balance a client's right to consult a lawyer
during trial testimony against the court's interest in the uncoached testimony of the
witness. The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that in the criminal case, a
defendant's right to counsel guarantees that the criminal defendant may consult with his
attorney during significant breaks in the trial and during overnight recesses. Although
the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet extended that same protection to the civil client,
several lower courts have concluded that civil parties should be able to consult with
their attorneys during breaks and overnight recesses in a trial.
It is clear that Judge Gawthrop misstated the general state of the law when he
concluded, "[d]uring a civil trial, a witness and his or her lawyer are not permitted
to confer at their pleasure during the witness's testimony."1 32 He justified his
order prohibiting contact between deponents and their counsel after the start of a
deposition on a false premise that a similar rule governed trials. There is no
generally accepted rule prohibiting consultation between a testifying party in a
civil trial and his or her attorney.
128. United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 212 F.R.D. 418,420 (D.D.C. 2002).
129. Id. at 419 (citations omitted).
130. State ex rel. Means v. King, 520 S.E.2d 875, 883 (W. Va. 1999) (footnote omitted).
131. Id. at 883 n.6 (citing Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980)).
132. Hall v. Clifton Precision Inc., 150 F.R.D. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (footnote omitted).
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VI. "No-CONSULTATION" ORDERS INJURE THE ATrORNEY-CLENT
RELATIONSHIP
Not only is Judge Gawthrop's justification for his order flawed, the order itself
is bad policy because of its impact on the attorney-client relationship.
A. UNSCRUPULOUS QUESTIONING
Judges who bar consultations between the deponent and his or her counsel
once a deposition begins strip the deponent of any defense to a wily or
unscrupulous deposing attorney. Under the Hall guidelines, the defending
attorney may not talk with his client/deponent once the deposition has begun,
except to discuss the assertion of a claim of privilege. If an unscrupulous
deposing attorney forces the deponent into an unfair admission with questions
similar to the proverbial "When did you stop beating your wife?" the Hall
guidelines prevent the defending attorney from taking a break to explain to the
deponent how the deposing attorney is confusing and unfairly trapping him into
an unintended and unfair admission.
When Judge Wettick of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Civil Division, in Pennsylvania was asked to impose the Hall guidelines, he
refused, explaining this potentially disastrous problem:
While the Hall v. Clifton Precision guidelines silence the unethical attorney
when I (an ethical attorney) am deposing his or her client, it also silences me
when this unethical attorney goes after my client at my client's deposition. This
is a bad trade-off because of the enormous damage that the unethical attorney
can do to my client and to the relationship between my client and myself if I am
silenced while my client is being unfairly deposed.13
3
Judge Wettick then said that every attorney involved in the discovery process
"must have the ability to prevent the mistreatment of any witness."' 134 He
concluded that the Hall guidelines stripped away the defending attorney's ability
to protect his witness. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted this same
problem when it said: "[T]he litigant usually lacks the skill and knowledge to
adequately prepare his case, and he requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceeding against him. '"
135
A few years after the decision in Hall, a partner and an associate in the law firm of
Fulbright and Jaworski wrote an article for the National Law Journal describing the
problems faced by counsel to a lay witness when the Hall guidelines are in place:
133. Acri v. Golden Triangle Mgmt. Acceptance Co., No. G.D. 93-12188 (Ct. Corn. P1. Alleghany County
1994), printed in 142 PrIrSBURGH LEGAL J. 225, 228 (1994).
134. Id.
135. Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1118 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
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It is difficult to prepare a lay witness to avoid the traps which a skilled
questioner can set. Whether such questions are unethical is debatable, but
surely it can be agreed that they are at least unfair. Is it fair to ask a question
which assumes a fact not in evidence (and which fact might not be true)? Is it
fair to preface a question with a summary of a witness' previous testimony that
is unduly favorable to the questioner's case? Is it fair to ask the same question
several times over the course of a long deposition in the hope that the witness
may give slightly differing answers, and thus put his or her credibility at
risk--or even inject a "genuine issue of material fact" into a case that otherwise
would be a prime candidate for resolution by summary judgment? Is it fair to
try to put words in a witness' mouth that will come back to haunt that witness
later in the case?
13 6
These authors went on to note that although counsel can spend time preparing his
or her witness for these unfair questions and can object to inappropriate ones, the
lay witness is still vulnerable to the unscrupulous attorney:
[U]nder Hall the witness cannot be instructed not to answer them-and the
objection cannot articulate what is wrong with the question, for that would be
considered coaching. Thus, one can be left with a record that is rife with
erroneous--or at best conflicting-testimony, a record that cannot be corrected
effectively when it counts the most-at the time the testimony is taken.1 37
Even in a jurisdiction that has implemented the Hall guidelines, the defending
attorney still has one method to protect her client when the deposing attorney
continues to ask offensive questions and a "no-consultation" order is in place.
She can seek a court order relieving her client of the obligation of continuing the
deposition. According to Rule 30(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
At any time during a deposition, on motion of a party or of the deponent and
upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such
manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party,
the court ... may order the officer conducting the examination to cease
forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the
taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c).138
However, if a "no-consultation" order is in effect, the defending attorney cannot
take a break in the deposition to discuss with her client the option of seeking a
court order under Rule 30(d)(4). She cannot determine if the client wishes to
continue answering the offensive questions so as to be done with the deposition,
or if the client wants the attorney to make a motion for relief from the harassing
136. Richard L. Jacobson & Rene Y. Quashie, A District Court's Ruling Limiting Consultation with
Witnesses During Depositions Could Restrict Longstanding Practices and Hinder Representation of a Client,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 15, 1997, at B4.
137. Id.
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(4).
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questions. In addition, the attorney cannot consult with her client about the
monetary cost of seeking a court order under Rule 30(d)(4) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 139 Thus, the one remaining method of protection in a
jurisdiction following Hall is ultimately illusory.
B. CORRECTING A FALSE OR MISLEADING STATEMENT
Judges who enter "no-consultation" orders also tie the hands of the ethical
lawyer who wishes to counsel his client to correct false or misleading information
to which the client has testified at the deposition. According to Rule 3.3(b) of the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct: "A lawyer
who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a
person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent
conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures,
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal."' 40 In the comments following
Rule 3.3, the drafters of the Model Rules make clear that the above rule applies
during depositions as well as during trials.1 41 During a deposition, if a lawyer
suspects that his client is testifying falsely, he has a duty under the Model Rules to
take "remedial measures" to correct the false testimony: "In such situations, the
advocate's proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise
the client of the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client's
cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or
evidence." 
142
A lawyer who is operating under a "no-consultation" order cannot take a break
in the deposition to remonstrate with his client to tell the truth without running
afoul of the "no-consultation" order prohibiting all contact between the lawyer
and his client once the deposition has begun. The ethical lawyer is in a double
bind. If he does take a break in the deposition and counsels his client to tell the
truth, he cannot guarantee the confidentiality of the conversation, because under
Hall, conversations in violation of the "no-consultation" order may be inquired
into by opposing counsel. If he sits silently while his client testifies falsely, he is
violating his ethical duty under Rule 3.3(b) of the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct "to remonstrate with his client confidentially" to tell the
truth.
C. END OF THE DEPOSITION QUESTIONING
At the end of a deposition, after the deposing attorney has completed his
139. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 1073.
140. MODEL RULES R. 3.3(b).
141. See MODEL RuLEs R. 3.3 cmt. 10 ("In such situations or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony
elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures.").
142. MODEL RuLEs R. 3.3 cmt. 10.
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examination, the defending attorney has an opportunity to ask his client questions
as part of the record of the deposition. In their excellent book, The Effective
Deposition, Techniques and Strategies That Work, David Malone and Peter
Hoffman explain the rarity of examining one's own client on the record:
Defending counsel usually does not ask any questions at the deposition of the
witness. The reason is simple. If the witness is friendly or a client, the best place
to ask questions is in the privacy of the lawyer's office where opposing counsel
cannot overhear what is being said. There is no sense sharing information with
the other side when there is no requirement of doing so. But exceptions to this
rule do arise. 14 3
Questioning by the defending attorney at the end of the deposition is similar to a
redirect examination at trial. Dennis R. Suplee and Diana S. Donaldson explain
this process in their book, The Deposition Handbook:
After the initial interrogator has completed his examination, other counsel
(usually in the order in which their clients appear in the caption) may question
the witness. When they have concluded their questioning, counsel for the
witness must decide whether to ask his own questions. Most frequently, he will
elect not to do so.14 4
Suplee and Donaldson describe the process an attorney should utilize in deciding
whether to ask the client questions at the end of a deposition. They point out that
the defending attorney needs to evaluate the client's ability to withstand
additional questioning and to defend the corrected responses. In order to make a
wise decision, Suplee and Donaldson suggest "counsel for the witness may want
to request a break after opposing counsel have finished their questioning, so that
he can confer with the witness about the additional questions he proposes to ask
and determine how the witness will respond to those questions."
' 145
In a jurisdiction in which a blanket "no-consultation" order has been entered,
or in a jurisdiction that has adopted a rule prohibiting attorney-deponent
conferences once the deposition has begun, the defending attorney will not be
able to consult with his client to determine the appropriate questions he should
ask to clarify any earlier confusion in his client's testimony. A "no-consultation"
order interferes with the attorney-client relationship by preventing the lawyer
from determining the appropriate questions to ask the client at the end of the
deposition.
For many deponents, the deposition process is unfamiliar and frightening.
Although most people have seen trials on television, they have not seen a
143. DAVID M. MALONE & PEER T. HoFFmAN, THE EFFEcTIVE DEPOSITION, TECHNIQUES AND STRATEGIES
THAT WORK 200 (2001).
144. DENNIs R. SuPLEE & DIANA S. DONALDSON, THE DEPOSITION HANDBOOK 209 (2002).
145. Id.
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deposition. With the exception of the depositions of President Clinton and Bill
Gates, few depositions have been publicized by the media.
Deponents rely on their counsel to explain the rules of the deposition and to
support them through the process. Deponents often spend many hours with their
counsel preparing for their depositions. They learn to trust their lawyers. Often
these preparatory sessions end with reassuring comments from the attorney such
as, "Don't worry, I'll be sitting right beside you. Remember, I can ask you
questions at the end of the deposition if we feel you need to correct or clarify any
of your answers."
In a jurisdiction with a "no-consultation" order in effect, the attorney is
prohibited from reassuring his or her client once the deposition begins. Even such
innocent comments as, "You're doing fine," and "This will be over before long,
hang in there," during a break in the deposition are prohibited. The client who has
learned to trust and depend on his or her attorney is bound to feel betrayed when
the attorney remains silent or makes a one word objection when the deposing
attorney asks a series of mean-spirited and irrelevant questions. 146 Judge Wettick
described the harm done to the attorney-client relationship in this situation: "It is
not possible for an attorney to maintain a satisfactory relationship with a client if
the attorney sits quietly while responding counsel unfairly beats up the client."'
' 47
The "no consultation" rule erodes the trust the client has in his or her lawyer.
D. VERIFYING THE TRUTHFULNESS OF CLIENT'S STATEMENTS
According to Judge Gawthrop, the purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is "to find and fix the truth."' 48 In jurisdictions where there is no rule
prohibiting contact between the attorney and deponent at a break in the
deposition, an experienced defending attorney who suspects the deponent has
testified to an inaccurate recounting of an event will probe the deponent's
memory at a break to determine the truthfulness of the testimony. The witness
may say, "No, I didn't make a mistake. What I just testified to is accurate." In that
situation, the ethical defending attorney should do nothing and the testimony will
stand.
At other times, the witness may acknowledge during the break that he or she
was confused and the earlier testimony was erroneous. At that point, the
defending attorney can urge the deponent to correct the record by volunteering
the information when the deposition resumes, or the defending attorney can elicit
the corrected testimony by questioning the deponent at the end of the deposition.
In either case, the result of the consultation between an ethical attorney and the
146. See Taylor, supra note 2.
147. Acri v. Golden Triangle Mgmt. Acceptance Co., No. G.D. 93-12188 (Ct. Corn. Pl. Alleghany County
1994), printed in 142 PIrSBURGH LEGAL J. 225, 229 (1994).
148. Hall v. Clifton Precision Inc., 150 F.R.D. 525,531 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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deponent should be accurate and truthful testimony. Thus, if the purpose of the
deposition is to obtain truthful testimony, a conference between the deponent and
his or her counsel is essential so that the defending attorney can point out the
potentially inaccurate testimony to the deponent.
Without the consultation occurring, the party conducting the deposition
proceeds on the basis of inaccurate information.... Alternatively, the depo-
nent's error may be discovered as the deposition proceeds. If information of
sufficient significance is involved in the mistake or misunderstanding, a portion
of the deposition must be repeated with the corrected information in mind.
Prohibiting the consultation could result in a needless expenditure of time and
resources and cut against the goals of economy that the no-consultation rule is
intended, in part, to foster. 149
Of course, the original testimony as well as the "corrected testimony" will
appear in the transcript. Those who distrust the truthfulness of "corrected
testimony" that follows a consultation between the attorney and the deponent will
still have the original testimony in the transcript. The client who has "corrected"
his testimony after consulting with his attorney can still be impeached with his
earlier testimony. At trial, the judge or the jury can use the two versions of the
testimony to evaluate the credibility of the witness.
E. THE "NO-CONSULTATION" RULE IS UNNECESSARY IN LIGHT OF OTHER
REMEDIES
Prior to 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were silent on the issue of
witness coaching in depositions. In 1993 Congress amended the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to prohibit witness coaching with objections that suggested the
answer to the deponent.150 In 2000, Rule 30(d) was amended yet again to further
strengthen its provisions. The amended Rule 30(d) provides: "Any objection
during a deposition must be stated concisely and in a non-argumentative and
non-suggestive manner. A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only
when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation directed by the
court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(4)." 151
Since 1993 all federal courts and any state courts that have adopted rules of
civil procedure modeled on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already have in
place a prohibition on suggestive or argumentative objections during a deposi-
tion. A court order prohibiting witness coaching is therefore merely duplicating
149. Taylor, supra note 2, at 1074.
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1) (1993) ("Any objection to evidence during a deposition shall be stated concisely
and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner. A party may instruct a deponent not to answer only
when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to present a
motion under paragraph (3).").
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(l).
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the requirements already in place in amended Rule 30(d).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also give the federal courts the authority
to enter sanctions against persons responsible for frustrating "the fair examina-
tion of the deponent" by causing "any impediment, delay or other conduct."'
' 52
Therefore, courts already have the authority to enter monetary or other sanctions
against any attorney engaging in witness coaching during a deposition. The
courts do not need to issue "no-consultation" orders to prevent witness coaching.
They merely need to sanction the attorney who engages in witness coaching.
In addition, some of the causes of witness coaching can be eliminated if judges
respond favorably to attorneys who seek protective orders to protect their clients
"from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense'
153
before a deposition begins. If a court grants a protective order before the
deposition begins, the justification for witness coaching has been eliminated. The
defending attorney should be able to use the protective order as a basis to instruct
the witness not to answer unfair questions covered by the protective order instead
of coaching the witness as to how to respond to the unfair questions.
Courts may also be able to eliminate witness coaching if they grant protective
orders to defending attorneys who adjourn the deposition to seek the court's
protection in the middle of the deposition. If a court grants a protective order
prohibiting questioning on an unfair topic, the defending attorney will no longer
have any justification for coaching his witness's responses. He can instead
instruct his witness not to answer based on the court's protective order.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS To CONTROL WITNESS COACHING AT
DEPOSITIONS AND MAINTAIN UNIFORM STANDARDS IN THE COURTS
Courts and legislatures that are considering methods of controlling the
coaching of witnesses at depositions should first assume that most attorneys will
observe the prohibitions against witness coaching found in Rule 30(d)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "Any objection during a deposition must be
stated concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner."'
154
Judge Wettick from the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County, concluded that in his experience few attorneys engage in egregious
coaching of witnesses:
Our discovery rules will not work unless the norms of the legal profession are
consistent with the standards of behavior described in the Preamble to the Rules
of Professional Conduct. If small numbers of lawyers deviate, judicial
intervention will be effective.... On the basis of my experience in Allegheny
County, I do not believe that we have a problem. An extremely high percentage
152. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(3).
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d).
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of lawyers want discovery to work and comply with the letter and spirit of the
discovery rules. 1
55
If Judge Wettick is correct, and the number of attorneys engaging in egregious
coaching of witnesses during a deposition is in fact small, there is no need for a
court to order or a legislature to enact blanket rules preventing any consultation
between an attorney and his witness once the deposition has commenced. The
adoption of such an order or rule is comparable to using a sledgehammer to
pound a tack into a wall. The remedy is far worse than the unwanted behavior.
Blanket "no-consultation" orders are not necessary and interfere with the
attorney-client relationship, leave the client undefended against unscrupulous
questioning, prevent attorneys from counseling clients to correct false statements,
and inhibit attorneys from checking the accuracy of testimony that may need to
be addressed before the end of the deposition.
Instead of the entry of blanket no-consultation orders, what is needed to correct
witness coaching is a targeted modification of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. One of the original purposes of the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was to develop a relatively uniform practice of law throughout
the country. As discussed earlier, there is no uniform practice regarding attorney
consultations with a deponent during a deposition. 156 To resolve this confusing
array of court orders, it is time for the United States Supreme Court again to
amend Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court should restrict
the coaching of witnesses during a deposition while a question is pending and
clarify that courts may not restrict attorney-witness consultations during recesses
and overnight breaks in a deposition.
I propose that the following two sentences be added to Rule 30(d)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Counsel may not consult with a deponent while the deposing attorney is in the
middle of a question, or is following a line of questions that can be completed
in a reasonable time except when necessary to discuss privilege issues, correct
a false statement, or correct an unintended misimpression left by the witness.
Courts may not restrict attorney-deponent consultations during recesses and
overnight breaks in a deposition.
The addition of these two sentences to Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure will set a national standard for depositions. Counsel for deponents will
know that breaks to consult with the deponent cannot be taken whenever a
difficult question is posed to the deponent. The deponent will have to answer the
question before taking a break. This rule will place the onus on deponent's
155. Acri v. Golden Triangle Mgmt. Acceptance Co., No. G.D. 93-12188 (Ct. Corn. PI. Alleghany County
1994), printed in 142 PrirSBURGH LEGAL J. 225,230 (1994).
156. See supra Part IV.
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counsel to prepare the deponent before the deposition begins. Witness prepara-
tion will have to occur before the deposition begins because breaks to counsel the
deponent will not be permitted while a question is pending.
The addition of the second sentence clarifying that judges may not intrude into
the attorney-client relationship by restricting counsel from talking with the client
during breaks and overnight recesses will resolve a confusing array of court
orders governing attorney-deponent consultations. As can be seen above, judges
have entered orders that range from no restriction all the way to a complete
prohibition on attorney-deponent consultations. In this age of multi-district
practice, attorneys who are attempting to zealously represent their clients need a
uniform set of rules regarding when they may consult with their clients. They
particularly need to know that their discussions with their clients will be
protected from inquiry. If the proposed amendment to Rule 30 is adopted, courts
will no longer be able to enter orders such as the one entered in Hall, permitting
the opposing side to inquire into the content of deponent-attorney consultations
that occur during recesses and overnight breaks in a deposition.
For the above reasons, I urge the United States Supreme Court to amend Rule
30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prohibit attorney-deponent
consultations while a question is pending at the deposition, but to permit
attorney-deponent consultations during breaks and overnight recesses in the
deposition.
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